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Introduction
In this paper, we develop a simple general equilibrium model in which an increase in
market size leads to an increase in the division of labor which brings about an increase
in rm productivity. In particular, we generalize Krugmans (1979) seminal new trade
model by opening the black box of the production function and allowing for an explicit
production chain in which a range of tasks is performed sequentially by a number of
specialized production teams. An increase in market size induces a deeper division of
labor among these teams which leads to an increase in rm productivity. Underlying
this is a trade-o¤ between the xed costs associated with establishing a team and the
marginal costs associated with the degree of specialization of the team which rms solve
di¤erently depending on the size of the market.
At the broadest level, the paper can be thought of as a formalization of Smiths
(1776) famous theorem that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market
in an environment in which the division of labor takes the same form as in his pin
factory.1 By embedding the pin factory into a framework of monopolistic competition,
it overcomes the dilemma emphasized by Stigler (1951: 185) that either the division
of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and characteristically, industries are
monopolized; or industries are characteristically competitive, and the theorem is false
or of little signicance. An increase in market size leads to both a deeper division of
labor within rms as well as the entry of new rms.
While our theory is not explicit about the nature of the increase in market size,
the usual interpretation of the Krugman (1979) model suggests trade liberalization as
a natural example. Recently, many empirical studies have focused on the productivity
e¤ects of trade liberalization (e.g. Pavcnik 2002; Treer 2004). Their results suggest
that there are important trade-induced improvements in industry productivity either
1Recall that in Smiths (1776: 7) pin factory one man draws out the wire, another straights it, a
third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fth grinds it at the top for receiving the head (...).
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through gains in average rm productivity (rm productivity e¤ect) or through the
reallocation of market share from less to more productive rms (reallocation e¤ect).
While our theory cannot speak to the reallocation e¤ect, it can be thought of as a
micro-foundation of the rm productivity e¤ect.2
As such, the paper contributes to a growing literature on the sources of the rm pro-
ductivity e¤ect. Previous work has mainly emphasized xed costs (e.g. Krugman 1979),
learning by exporting (e.g. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998), competition-induced in-
novation (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005), or a horizontal focusing on core competencies by
multi-product rms (e.g. Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2011).
Only McLaren (2000) also studies the productivity gains of a trade-induced vertical
restructuring of production. Both the source of the productivity gains as well as the
link between trade liberalization and the vertical restructuring of production are very
di¤erent in his model, however.
An additional implication of our model is that seemingly superior technologies de-
veloped in larger markets, characterized by lower xed costs of establishing teams and a
ner division of labor across teams, may not be appropriate for smaller markets. Firms
in developing countries may therefore not have an incentive to adopt technologies from
developed countries even if they are freely available to them. This observation o¤ers a
novel explanation for the localized character of technology which is usually rationalized
by arguing that important components of technology are tacit in nature (e.g. Keller,
2004: 753). It essentially elaborates on the remark of Stigler (1951: 193) that Amer-
ican production methods will often be too specialized to be an appropriate model for
industrialization in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we lay out the basic model,
solve for the optimal organization of production, characterize the general equilibrium,
analyze the e¤ects of an increase in market size, consider the scope for international
2Well-known formal treatments of the reallocation e¤ect include Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al
(2003).
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technology transfers, and o¤er some concluding remarks.
1 Basic setup
There are L consumers who are endowed with one unit of labor each. They have access
to n nal goods over which they have love of variety-preferences
U =
nX
i=1
u (xi) (1)
where u(xi) is the utility derived from consuming x units of nal good i which is
continuous and di¤erentiable and satises u0 (xi) > 0 and u00 (xi) < 0. Consumers
maximize this utility subject to their budget constraints 1 =
Pn
i=1 pixi, where pi is the
price paid for good i and the wage rate is normalized to 1.
As can be seen from the rst order conditions of the consumersmaximization prob-
lems, the resulting demands have elasticity " (xi) =   u
0(xi)
xiu00(xi) . Following Krugman
(1979), we assume that "0(xi) < 0 which is equivalent to assuming that the demand
curves are less convex than in the constant elasticity case (linear demand curves would
be an example). This assumption ensures that an increase in market size leads to an
increase in rm output which is necessary for market size to a¤ect the division of labor
within rms. We also assume that "(0) > 1 + 1 and that there exists an x > 0 such
that " (x) = 1 + 1 , where  is a cost parameter to be dened below.
3 These parameter
restrictions guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a monopolistically competitive
equilibrium.
The production of each nal good requires the sequential performance of a number
of tasks. Early tasks are concerned with obtaining raw materials which are then rened
3A polynomial of degree higher than 2 for the function u (x) would satisfy this condition, as would any
sum of more than one power function of x. For instance, the quadratic function u (x) = ax  x2=2 with
x 2 [0; a=2] yields a linear demand system and the following simple expression for the demand elasticity,
" (x) = a=x  1, which satises "0 (x) < 0, " (0) > 1 + 1=, and x = a
2+1=
such that " (x) = 1 + 1

.
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successively in later production stages. The set of these tasks is represented by a
segment of length normalized to 2 which we call the production chain. To produce
the nal good, all tasks ! 2 [0; 2] have to be performed sequentially. If only tasks
! 2 [0; !1], 0 < !1 < 2, are performed, a preliminary good !1 is obtained. This
preliminary good !1 can then be transformed into a more downstream preliminary
good !2, 0 < !1 < !2 < 2, by performing the additional tasks ! 2 [!1; !2] and so
on. One unit of each task is required to produce one unit of the nal good. Similarly,
one unit of the relevant subset of tasks is required to produce one unit of a preliminary
good.4
All production tasks associated with a given nal good are performed by production
teams within a single rm. Before being able to perform any tasks, a team needs to
acquire a core competency c 2 [0; 2] in the production chain which requires f units of
labor. To perform one unit of each task in the range [!1; !2], the team then further
needs
l (!1; !2) =
1
2
Z !2
!1
jc  !jd! (2)
units of labor where  > 0 so that it gets worse at performing a given task the further
away that task is from its core competency. Teams are symmetric in the sense that the
parameters f and  are the same across teams. The rm can choose how many teams
are established, which core competencies they acquire, and which production tasks they
perform.
2 Optimal organization of production
Equation (2) implies that the cost of producing one unit of output is minimized if
each task is performed by only one team, the teamscore competencies are uniformly
distributed along the production chain, and each team performs a symmetric range of
4A similar representation of the production process has been used by Dixit and Grossman (1982).
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tasks around its core competency. The minimum total cost of producing y units of
output conditional on a given number of teams t can therefore be written as
TC = t
 
f + y
Z 1
t
0
!d!
!
(3)
since each team performs 2t tasks of which half are to the right and half are to the left
of its core competency.
The optimal number of teams solves a trade-o¤ between xed and marginal costs.
This trade-o¤ can be seen most clearly by rewriting equation (3) as TC = tf + yt
 
+1 .
On the one hand, more teams imply higher xed costs since more core competencies
need to be acquired. On the other hand, more teams imply lower marginal costs since
each team performs a narrower range of tasks around its core competency. Minimizing
this expression with respect to t yields
t =


 + 1
y
f
 1
+1
(4)
Hence, the optimal number of teams is increasing in output. Intuitively, higher
output makes marginal costs more important relative to xed costs so that it is optimal
to set up a larger number of more highly specialized teams. Notice that the range of
tasks performed by each team is inversely proportional to the number of teams since the
production chain is of a given length and production tasks are equally divided among
teams.
As is easy to verify, equations (3) and (4) imply that the average cost is given by
AC =

 + 1

f
y
 
+1
(5)
Notice that the average cost is decreasing in output so that the production technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale. Underlying this are two distinct e¤ects which can
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be seen most clearly by expressing the average cost as AC = tfy + t
R 1
t
0 !
d! using
equation (3). First, the average cost falls because the xed costs get spread over more
units of output. Second, the average cost falls because the number of teams is increased
to rebalance xed and marginal costs. Only the former e¤ect is present in Krugman
(1979).5 The second e¤ect magnies the rst e¤ect since the number of teams is chosen
to minimize costs.
While the details of equations (3) - (5) clearly depend on functional form assump-
tions, they capture what seems to be a general point: if production tasks are divided
among specialized teams who need to incur a xed cost to acquire a core competency
and get worse at performing a task the further away it is from their core competency,
the optimal number of teams is increasing in output since the increase in output makes
marginal costs more important relative to xed costs. We therefore state this result as
proposition 1:
Proposition 1 The optimal number of teams is increasing in rm output.
Proof. Follows immediately from equation (4).
3 General equilibrium
Firms interact in a monopolistically competitive fashion in the sense that they maximize
prots taking the marginal utility of income as given and enter until all prots are
driven down to zero. Free entry implies that prices are equal to average costs and prot
maximization implies that rms charge a proportional mark-up  (x) = "(x)"(x) 1 over
marginal costs. The equilibrium is characterized by the following two conditions,
p =

 + 1

f
y
 
+1
(6)
5 Indeed, the model would reduce to Krugman (1979) if the number of teams were not a choice
variable.
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p =
 (y=L)
 + 1

 + 1

f
y
 
+1
(7)
The rst condition follows immediately from equation (5). The second condition
combines the goods market clearing condition y = Lx with the fact that marginal costs
are given by MC = 1+1

+1

f
y
 
+1
which is obtained by straightforward manipulation
of equation (5).6 The relationships (6) and (7) are two equations in the two unknowns p
and y which we refer to as the FE (free entry) curve and the PM (prot maximization)
curve in the following. The FE curve is downward-sloping. The PM curve is made up
of two multiplicative terms. The rst term, (y=L)+1 , is smaller than 1 at zero because
" (0) > 1 + 1 , increasing in y because "
0 (x) < 0, and crosses 1 at some nite x because
" (x) = 1 + 1 . The second term is the same term as the FE curve. Therefore, the PM
curve intersects the FE curve only once from below, as illustrated in Figure 1, so that
p and y are uniquely pinned down.7 Given y, the equilibrium t can then be determined
from equation (4).
Notice that equations (6) and (7) imply that mark-ups are constant in equilibrium
even though preferences are not of the constant elasticity form. This is due to the fact
that changes in the optimal division of labor ensure that marginal costs and average costs
fall proportionately in rm output so that mark-ups have to be constant for zero prots
to prevail. This exact proportionality of marginal costs and average costs depends on
special functional form assumptions and should not be taken literally. However, it may
prove useful as a modeling tool in other applications which seek to allow for a relatively
general demand system without losing the tractability of constant elasticity preferences.
6All subscripts have been dropped to reect the symmetry of the equilibrium.
7Notice that the PM curve does not have to be downward sloping.
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4 Increase in market size
We rst analyze an increase in market size which is captured by an increase in the
number of consumers L. As can be seen from equations (6) and (7), an increase in
market size leaves the FE curve unchanged but leads to a downward shift of the PM
curve. Intuitively, an increase in the number of consumers implies that each consumer
gets less of a given quantity of output which increases demand elasticities and reduces
mark-ups, other things equal. As illustrated in Figure 2, this downward shift of the
PM curve implies that rms charge less and produce more which is associated with an
increase in the number of teams per rm as indicated by equation (4). Intuitively, the
larger market allows rms to sell more which makes them establish a larger number of
more highly specialized production teams.
Since average costs are simply the inverse of rm output per worker, the fall in
average costs associated with the increase in rm output also represents an increase
in rm productivity. Recall that average costs fall because the xed costs get spread
over more units of output and the number of teams is increased to rebalance xed
and marginal costs. Hence, while the model continues to feature the original Krugman
(1979) rm productivity e¤ect, it also features a new rm productivity e¤ect which
operates through an increase in the division of labor. The latter e¤ect magnies the
former e¤ect since the degree of the division of labor is chosen optimally by rms.
Hence, an increase in market size indeed leads to an increase in the division of
labor which is associated with an increase in rm productivity. It must be emphasized,
however, that this result depends on the fact that rm output is increasing in market
size which, in turn, depends on the assumption that the demand curves are less convex
than in the constant elasticity case. If utility was instead of the constant elasticity form
as in Krugman (1980), the number of rms would simply increase proportionately with
market size so that individual rm output would remain unchanged. With this caveat
in mind, we state this result as proposition 2:
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Proposition 2 An increase in market size leads to an increase in the division of labor
which is associated with an increase in rm productivity.
Proof. Follows immediately from Figure 2 and equation (4).
5 Technology transfer
We now consider the scope for technology transfers from a Northern country to a South-
ern country, where rms in the Northern country operate seemingly superior technolo-
gies. To analyze technology transfers, we must rst dene what a technology is. In the
context of this model, a technology has two key components. The rst corresponds to
the e¢ ciency with which a rm is able to train specialized production teams around a
core competency and is captured by the xed cost f .8 The second corresponds to the
degree of division of labor within a rm and is captured by the number of specialized
production teams t.
So far, we have treated only the xed cost f as a parameter and allowed rms to
optimally choose their organization t. This endogenous choice was meant to capture
a long-run adjustment during which incumbents either reorganize or lose out to bet-
ter organized entrants. It is plausible, however, that both the xed cost f and the
organization t have to be jointly transferred in the case of international technology
transfers. This is because the organization of production solves a complex logistical
problem so that a Southern rm is unlikely to be able to rearrange the production chain
of a Northern rm to appropriately reect local constraints.
Given the premise that technology transfers entail both f and t, it is now easy to
see that a Southern rm might be unwilling to adopt a seemingly superior Northern
technology. In particular, suppose that the North has a larger market (LN > LS) and
8Of course, the e¢ ciency with which a rm is able to train specialized production teams around a
core competency also depends on the parameter . However, our point can be made most clearly with
reference to the parameter f so that we focus on it in the following.
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lower xed costs (fN < fS) so that the division of labor is ner there (tN > tS). If
a Southern rm then adopts the Northern technology, its protability increases on the
one hand due to the lower xed cost but decreases on the other hand as a result of the
suboptimally large number of teams. The former e¤ect dominates the latter one only
if the market size di¤erences underlying the di¤erences in the optimal organization of
production are su¢ ciently small.
As a result, international technology transfers may not occur even though Northern
rms are unambiguously more productive and make their technology freely available
to Southern rms. We believe that this o¤ers a novel perspective on the notion of
appropriate technology (e.g. Basu and Weil, 1998) and a novel explanation for the
localized character of technology which is usually rationalized by arguing that important
components of technology are tacit in nature (e.g. Keller, 2004: 753). We state our
reasoning more rigorously as proposition 3:
Proposition 3 For any di¤erence in market size between a larger North and a smaller
South (LN > LS), there exists  > 0 such that no Southern rm would want to adopt a
Northern technology characterized by the Northern division of labor tN unless it o¤ers
them a reduction in their xed cost at least as large as .
Proof. Proposition 2 and equation (4) imply that tN > tS . From equation (3) and the
optimal choice of t given f , it follows directly that a Southern rms maximum prots,
S , are decreasing in f and decreasing with departures away from the optimal tS : S
satises S (fS ; tS) > S (fS ; tN ),
@S
@f < 0,
@S
@t (fS ; tS) = 0, and
@2S
@t2
< 0. Therefore
there exists a  > 0 such that S (fS ; tS) = S (fS  ; tN ). For any reduction in the
xed cost smaller than , i.e. fS    < fN < fS , we have S (fS ; tS) > S (fN ; tN ),
and no Southern rm would adopt the Northern technology (fN ; tN ) despite its strictly
lower xed cost.
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Conclusion
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the
extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other
words, by the extent of the market. In this paper, we have demonstrated that this
famous theorem of Smith (1776: 16) can be rationalized by embedding a production
chain of the sort found in his pin factory into Krugmans (1979) seminal new trade
environment. In a nutshell, we rst established that the division of labor is limited by
the extent of rm output and then demonstrated that rm output is increasing in the
extent of the market. We also showed that in such an environment, seemingly superior
technologies developed in large markets may not be appropriate for smaller markets
thus limiting the scope for international technology transfers.
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